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“Our Neighbors In The Americas”: Obama, Empathy,
and the Cuban Thaw
By Sarah E. McKinnis1
1
Yale University

ABSTRACT

In the study of International Relations, there is growing research and consideration of the significance of empathy
in political communications and nation-to-nation relationships. This article examines cognitive empathy, the ability to understand the perspectives and feelings of another, in the case of the Cuban Thaw, the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between Cuba and The United States. It traces President Obama’s use of empathy in publicly
communicating intentions towards Cubans and Americans, a rhetoric that marks a contrast from the previous U.S.
administrations’ attitudes toward Cuba. This article then analyzes the efficacy of that rhetoric, finding that though
there are indications of positive effects, it is difficult to understand the long-term impact of his actions at this time.
This case provides context as to the positive transformative power of empathy in IR, and the efficacy of empathetic rhetoric in shifting public attitudes and encouraging cooperation between previously antagonistic nations.
Empathy as a tool faces a number of practical limitations, all of which deserve greater research and attention.

INTRODUCTION
In March of 2016, Barack Obama traveled to Cuba with a delegation of family, staff, and Democrat and Republican congressional
representatives, marking the first time in eighty-eight years that a
sitting United States president visited the country. This was part
of a much larger effort to normalize diplomatic relations between
the United States and Cuba, which had been officially severed in
1961. Since then, U.S. policy towards Cuba had been marked by
isolation and hostility, including repeated attempts to overthrow
Cuba’s Communist government. Obama’s approach came as a drastic change in U.S. rhetoric and policy, and it included a nuanced
understanding of the position of Cuba, its people, and its leaders.
This paper examines the role of this nuanced understanding, better
understood as empathy, in facilitating the administration’s new approach by focusing on one central question—where and how did
Obama employ empathy in the Cuban Thaw and what was the impact of this shift in rhetoric?

his empathetic approach was successful in facilitating diplomatic
change and in shifting public opinion in both the U.S. and Cuba.
However, it was unable to generate significant democratic reforms
in Cuba. This analysis adds to accruing research on empathy in
International Relations and helps increase understanding of the importance of empathy as a negotiating tool and as something to be
employed more often, due to its efficacy in encouraging cooperation between previously antagonistic nations.
EMPATHY IN IR

In line with IR scholarship on emotions, empathy will be theorized
here as the “cognitive projection of oneself into the shoes of another, whilst maintaining a clear differentiation between self and
other,” (Head, 2012, p. 39) or, “to put oneself into the other’s place”
(Wheeeler, 2008, p. 495). This definition of empathy has often been
referred to as “cognitive empathy,” as opposed to “affective empathy,” which involves feeling the same emotions as the person with
Empathy and other emotions have traditionally been dismissed in whom you are empathizing (Head, 2012, p. 39).2
IR as irrational and something to be mitigated, but they have long
been part of practicing politics and diplomacy (Head, 2012, p. 37). Cognitive empathy has been shown to be an important part of presMore recent research reveals the significance of empathy in these idential leadership, particularly in allowing individuals to make
domains and evidence that reason and emotion are significantly in- more informed decisions and “formulate effective rhetorical argutertwined (Yorke, 2017, p. 14). Obama, in particular, made empathy ments” (Shogan, 2009, p. 874). This speaks to the importance of
a large part of his politics, from the time he was a senator (Shogan, empathy in strategic communications, which is further illuminated
2009, p. 872). It also was a fundamental part of his personal ethics by Yorke, who explains that communication employing empathy
and character.1
involves perceptive listening and understanding of the point of
view of one’s counterpart (Head, 2012, p. 43). In the case of foreign
This paper will analyze Obama’s speeches and policy documents policy, empathy can be used strategically to “develop cooperation
between 2014-2016, during which U.S.-Cuba relations were nor- with other countries and cultures through both public statements
malized, a period of time known as the Cuban Thaw, arguing that and private meetings” (Yorke, 2017, p. 150).
1 See (Obama, 2006) for background.

2 See also (Yorke, 2017, p. 142) & (Head, 2016, p. 103).
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Another strategic use of empathy is in security dilemma sensibility, determine the intensity or relative weight of an emotion in relation
defined as:
to other emotions, nor does it indicate the involvement of countervailing emotions” (Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 24). Even emotion
[T]he ability to understand the role that fear might play in
discourse analysis—in which emotions are more thoroughly intetheir attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role
grated into the method used—runs the risk of “homogenizing the
that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear
emotions of groups” (Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 24). In acknowl(Booth & Wheeler, 2007, as cited in Wheeler, 2008, p. 496)
edging these biases and challenges, this research can be analyzed
for what it adds to the scholarship on empathy in IR while underBy understanding how an adversary views their state, a leader can standing the limits on its conclusions.
better judge their motives and therefore diminish the fear inherent
in the security dilemma, though not remove it entirely (Wheeler,
2008, pp. 495-496).
Although empathy can successfully be used strategically, it will
only be effective if it is perceived as genuine (Shogan, 2009, pp.
862-874). Even within this definition, scholars and practitioners
have identified limits and even dangers to empathy.3 In the following analysis, the stated definition of empathy will be used to analyze where President Obama exhibited empathy, how different individuals and groups responded, and if it was successful in achieving
the goals of the Obama administration.
METHODOLOGY
In order to determine where President Obama used empathy, this
paper will focus on five central speeches by Obama in the period between December 2014, when the policy changes were announced,
and March 2016, when Obama visited Cuba. This will include discourse analysis of the transcripts, along with analysis of the videos,
which will allow for the rhetoric to be placed in the context of the
event and audience, his body language, and tone. Yorke delineates
the criteria used by scholars of empathy in discourse analysis, including “evidence of perspective taking, and seeking to understand
different sections of society and their political, historical, structural,
and social-economic context;” “awareness of one’s own words and
actions and how this might be perceived;” and “evidence of discussions of the importance of understanding another point of view
and acknowledgement of recognition” (Yorke, 2017, p. 146). Also
noted and included in these criteria will be words, phrases, comparisons, and analogies with connotations of empathy, particularly
respect and trust towards a Cuban audience, and calls to stand in the
shoes of the Cuban people that are directed toward a U.S. audience.
This paper will rely on articles from The New York Times and The
Wall Street Journal to show how Obama’s speeches were received.
It will also include an analysis of some of Cuban President Raúl
Castro’s remarks, which will serve to illuminate if and when Castro
implemented empathy in his rhetoric.

“U.S. policy towards Cuba had been
marked by isolation and hostility,
including repeated attempts to overthrow
Cuba’s Communist government. Obama’s
approach came as a drastic change in
U.S. rhetoric and policy.”

TRANSFORMING RELATIONS THROUGH EMPATHY
Obama’s belief in the importance of understanding others’ perspectives made possible the negotiations that led to the normalization of
U.S.-Cuba relations. An analysis of empathy in shifting the relationship has to acknowledge the secret negotiations that happened prior
to the December 17, 2014, announcement of policy changes. One
factor was Obama’s belief—contrary to nearly the entire foreign policy establishment—that, as he said, “It. Is. Not. A. Reward. To. Talk.
To. Folks.” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 15). This ran contrary to the rhetoric
used by the previous administration, in which President Bush consistently laid out preconditions for negotiating a change in the relationship and maintained a policy of isolation and forced regime change
(Bush, 2002). The contrast shows that empathy as employed by
Obama was a distinct shift in the way the U.S. thought about Cuba.
Even before public announcement of the changes, Obama and his
administration recognized the importance of acknowledging the historical and political context of the relationship and Cuba’s point of
view, which involved signaling from both countries demonstrating
that they were serious about shifting the relationship (Yorke, 2017,
p. 146). Ben Rhodes—one of the lead negotiators during the Cuban
Thaw and Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications—described a series of small acts by Obama that
indicated his understanding of the history and his desire to move beyond it, for example, when in 2013 he became the first U.S. president to shake the hand of a Cuban president “since the revolution”
(Rhodes, 2017, p. 261). The eventual success of these actions in
bringing Cuba and the U.S. to an agreement suggests that empathetic
rhetoric should be used more frequently in initial negotiations.

However, even with these objectives, there are limitations to discourse analysis and the analysis of empathy more generally. As
Mercer (1996) stated, “emotion is hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure, and hard to isolate from others” (as cited
in Clément & Sangar, 2017, p. 7). In focusing on externally displayed emotion, some of these challenges will be mitigated, but it
will remain difficult to measure the role of the empathy displayed in The first public announcement of the policy changes came on Desubsequent tangible political changes. Discourse analysis “cannot cember 17, 2014. Obama framed the shift in relations as explicitly
with the “people of Cuba,” rather than Cuba as a state or with the
3 See (Bloom, 2016) & (Johnson, 2010, p. 505) for more on the limits of empathy. Cuban government. This framing, along with his acknowledgement
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/20
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of the political, social, and historical perspectives of Cubans and
Cuban Americans, highlights the centrality of empathy to his rhetoric surrounding the policy. Like U.S. negotiators did in private with
their Cuban counterparts, Obama acknowledges the “complicated
history” between the two countries and the ways in which U.S. actions have impacted Cubans, including the Bay of Pigs invasion
and the “legacy of …colonization” (Obama, 2014a). In doing so, he
exhibits an understanding that the U.S. government’s interventions
have provoked anti-American sentiment and led to fear contributing to the hostility between the two countries. This recognition is
important in mitigating the security dilemma and diplomatic stalemate the two nations faced (Wheeler, 2008, p. 496).
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policy that for 50 years “had not changed on the part of the United
States” (Obama & Castro, 2015). Seeking to understand the perspectives that Castro and many Cubans would have concerning the
U.S. and U.S. action is one mechanism through which President
Obama exercises empathy.

Even President Castro begins to use this rhetoric, speaking about
the U.S. and Cuba as neighbors developing “a friendship between
our two peoples” and having “respect for the ideas of the other,”
while at a joint press conference with Obama (Obama & Castro,
2016a). This press conference alone was a success for the Obama
administration; Rhodes describes how the “Cuban journalists, all
employees of state-run media, seemed astonished to see their own
Obama also demonstrates an understanding of how his words and leader taking questions” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 355).
his decision to pursue normalization of diplomatic relations would
be perceived4 by the Cuban American community, most of whom Obama’s language around physical proximity and connection bewere staunchly opposed to the Castro government. Coverage of tween Cubans and Americans resonated with the press, and covthis announcement, however, reveals that Obama’s attempts to see erage of the events of 2015 reflected more positive, though still
this from the side of Cuban Americans and Cuban advocates for cautious, views of the opening with Cuba, with most vocal opposiregime change were unsuccessful in changing the minds of these tion coming from Republican members of Congress (Davis, 2015;
individuals. Older Cuban dissidents felt that this was a betrayal by Schwartz, et al., 2015). Insights from Cuban citizens tended toward
Obama and would not lead to concessions by the Castros, and all skepticism, specifically about concessions Castro would make, but
seven Cuban American legislators in Congress opposed it (Burnett many were also hopeful.6 All of this indicates that empathetic rhet& Neuman, 2014; Hook, 2014). It did seem to resonate, however, oric has an important role to play in international relations, specifiwith a younger generation of Cuban-Americans, who were “open cally on the level of public opinion.
to change” (Baker, 2014).
Videos of President Obama’s remarks also reveal more about his
President Raúl Castro, speaking on the change in policy the same day, attempts to express and cultivate empathy. Throughout his presidenacknowledged the “profound differences” between the two coun- cy, Obama spoke in a calm, slower manner that conveyed an air of
tries and his “willingness to dialogue on all these issues” (“Speech”, thoughtfulness and genuine care about the matter at hand. This was
2014). His speech reiterated his belief in Communist rule, though no different for his speeches about Cuba. In the video of Obama’s
the fact that he was willing to engage in dialogue about U.S. con- initial statement on the policy changes in 2014, his focus on the
cerns was a significant change from being unwilling to discuss these Cuban people and the unity required for this effort is further illumimatters until the embargo was lifted (“Speech”, 2014; Bush, 2007). nated by his emphasis on “and” when he talks about creating “more
opportunities for the American and Cuban people,” and how “inIn later statements regarding the normalization of U.S.-Cuba rela- creased commerce is good for Americans and for Cubans” (Obama,
tions, Obama uses similar rhetoric with empathetic connotations. 2014b). Not only do his words convey empathy, but his engagement
When announcing on July 1, 2015, that the United States formally and emphasis while speaking makes this display quite genuine.
re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba and would reopen an
embassy in the country, Obama frequently refers to Cubans as the Furthermore, Obama’s notation of differences between the U.S.
United States’ “neighbors” and repeatedly talks about the physical and Cuba is not only an example of his understanding of contrastproximity of the two countries, being “separated by only 90 miles” ing views, but also demonstrates that he is keenly aware of what
(Obama, 2015a; Obama & Castro, 2015; Obama & Castro, 2016a). empathy is and what it is not. As Yorke describes, “It should be
This language attempts to evoke affective empathy for Cuba and emphasised that the act of empathising does not mean condoning
Cubans by highlighting how close the two are to Americans, a mes- acts of terror or atrocities” (Yorke, 2017, p. 152). While Obama is
sage of similarity that would make it easier for the general public able to build trust between the U.S. and the Cuban government by
to understand his decisions. At the same time, he demonstrates a re- exhibiting empathy, he successfully maintains American interests
spect for Cuban ingenuity and sovereignty by talking about certain because he understands and states publicly that he does not need to
shared values and where citizens of both countries have worked agree with or support Castro in order to interact diplomatically. In
together “in Haiti against Cholera, and in West Africa against Eb- previous administrations and in the eyes of many established forola” (Obama & Castro, 2016a).5 This show of respect is a crucial eign policy experts, talking with a country was equivalent to giving
shift from the Bush administration, in which Cubans were framed in to their demands. This notion that “seeing to understand differas helpless members of a “shattered society,” often spoken to in a ent sections of society and their political, historical, structural, and
patronizing manner (Bush, 2007). In remarks before a meeting with social-economic context” equates to feeling compassionate or supPresident Castro on April 11, 2015, Obama again repeats language portive towards an adversary is misguided, yet it was the justificaacknowledging the differences and “mistrust” that had developed tion for the United States’ Cuba policy for decades (Yorke, 2017, p.
between the two countries, as well as the historical context of a 146). Maintaining that attitude fostered anti-American sentiment in
4 Cited as a criterion of empathetic discourse in (Yorke, 2017, p. 146).
5 See (Obama & Castro, 2015) for further examples of this rhetoric.

6 See (Burnett, 2015) and (“In Cuban Capital”, 2014) for further information.
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Cuba and only increased tensions between the two countries, rather 2016). The poll showed 52 percent of Americans approved of the
than actually pushing Cuba towards democratic reforms; Obama way Obama was “handling relations with Cuba,” which was “up
provided a different, more hopeful path.
from 44 percent in December 2014,” when he first announced the
policy changes (Sussman, 2016). Obama’s success in shifting pubThe climax of the Cuban Thaw was President Obama’s trip to Cuba lic opinion in support of his policy was also evident in the estabin March 2016, where on March 22 he spoke in Havana. The Cu- lishment of the New Cuba PAC, a pro-normalization group started
ban government agreed to have “Obama’s speech be broadcast— in May 2015. The Wall Street Journal reported that the group had
uncensored—to the Cuban people,” the likes of which had never raised more than $178,000 by July 2015, which was an indication
before happened in Cuba (Rhodes, 2018, p. 354). A great deal of of increasing “public support for closer ties between the two counthought went into how to balance recognition of values and posi- tries” (Schwartz, 2015b).
tions of all the parties involved—from Castro, to the Cuban people, to American interests, and possibly most importantly, to Cuban Obama’s major goal to “normalize relations between [the] two
American communities. Rhodes describes visiting such communi- countries” was achieved: diplomatic relations between the two
ties in Miami, Florida: “Cuban Americans wanted to hear [Obama] countries were reestablished, and the respective embassies opened
make the case for democracy, for openness, and to include them in in the U.S. and Cuba (Obama, 2014a; Obama, 2015b). The adminwhatever story he told about Cuba” (Rhodes, 2018, p. 353). This is istration also removed Cuba from the list of designated state sponreflected in the speech when Obama talks about shared culture and sors of terrorism in May 2015 (Schwartz, 2015a). In his speech to
religion, the reconciliation of families after decades, and when he the Cuban people, Obama outlined other steps he took to loosen
says, “In the United States, we have a clear monument to what the restrictions, which included restoring “direct flights and mail serCuban people can build: it’s called Miami” (Obama, 2016). When vice,” expanding “commercial ties,” and increasing “the capacity
Rhodes describes the speech, he says, “Every Cuban would hear it of Americans to travel and do business in Cuba” (Obama, 2016).
a different way. I had tried to paint a picture of a future in which Additionally, on January 12, 2017, Obama announced an end to
there was a place for everyone’s story” (Rhodes, 2018, pp. 358- the “wet foot, dry foot” immigration policy that allowed Cubans
359). This was especially important in the context of the event; who arrived on U.S. soil without visas to stay and gain legal resithe fact that the audience was largely Cuban was reflected in the dency. This policy was unique to Cuban migrants and described by
way Obama spoke directly to Cuban citizens more than he had in national security archivist Peter Kornbluh as “‘a relic of the Cold
previous speeches. This was his most full-throated pitch for democ- War’” (Davis & Robles, 2017). These were all significant steps in
racy in Cuba, yet he also made clear that he understood that these improving relations between the two countries.
proposals were “sensitive, especially coming from an American
President.” He continues:
Despite these changes, Obama’s call to Congress to lift the “embargo that is a legacy of a failed policy” was unsuccessful (Obama,
Before 1959, some Americans saw Cuba as something to ex2015b). Shifting public opinion and outside support was not signifploit, ignored poverty, enabled corruption. And since 1959,
icant enough to get the Republican-controlled House and Senate
we’ve been shadow-boxers in this battle of geopolitics and
to enact such legislation.7 As a result, President Trump was able
to walk back many of the Obama administration’s changes. The
personalities. I know the history, but I refuse to be trapped by
Trump administration’s policy more closely resembles the policies
it… What changes come will depend upon the Cuban people.
that preceded Obama, though diplomatic relations remain relatively
We will not impose our political or economic system on you
intact (“U.S.-Cuba Relations”, n.d.).
(Obama, 2016)
Furthermore, Obama’s goals of spurring democratic reforms and
creating more open dialogue through reestablishing this relationship were not realized. He repeatedly stated his belief that person-to-person interactions and economic reforms would generate
change in Cuba, explaining that Cuban Americans “are the best
possible ambassadors for [U.S.] values,” and that the U.S. “can do
more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through
engagement” (Obama, 2014a). However, foreign policy scholars
found that years later, this policy showed weak returns. Despite increases in tourism and remittances, there was no expansion of internet access or decrease in internet censorship, and, in 2016, Cuban
authorities detained a record high number of individuals (Abrams,
2018). Experts at the Council on Foreign Relations believe that the
policies failed to generate improvements in human rights because
“the Obama administration failed to demand any improvements
EVALUATING SUCCESS
from Cuba in exchange for the various diplomatic, trade, and travOverall, media and rhetorical analysis demonstrated a shift towards el concessions it granted Havana” (Abrams, 2018). While Obama
a more positive view of normalization. A New York Times/CBS
News poll conducted in March 2016 found that nearly 60 percent of 7 See (Baker, 2014) and (Davis, 2015) for further background on the role of
Americans supported “normalizing relations with Cuba” (Sussman, Congress.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/20
4
This is notable not only because of Obama’s awareness of how
his words might be perceived by the audience, but also because
his position strays from the traditional model of American power
and hegemony.

“...rather than actually pushing
Cuba towards democratic reforms;
Obama provided a different, more
hopeful path.”
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did call upon the Castro regime to make changes, there may have
been other opportunities to force more concessions in exchange for
loosening restrictions. Based on his rhetoric, though, he believed
that progress would come from the Cuban people as the U.S. lifted
restrictions, and he wanted to respect Cuba’s sovereignty (Obama,
2016). These failings speak to the limitations of rhetoric alone to
create change.

MOVING FORWARD
This analysis hits upon aforementioned challenges of analyzing
emotions in foreign policy. It is difficult to extract empathy from
the other emotions that Obama evokes in his speeches, such as hope
and unity. In some cases, these can be seen as mechanisms that
empathy is exercised through, but often they stand on their own
as a different kind of emotional rhetoric. It is also challenging to
directly correlate the public attitude changes to the rhetoric Obama
used, yet because this approach was so different from what the public had seen before, it is fair to attribute the shift in public relations
and opening up of Cubans to the U.S. in part to Obama’s rhetoric
and willingness to engage, much of which relied upon empathy.
Additionally, the recency of these events makes it impossible to
judge the long-term impact of Obama’s policy of empathy, and it
also means that Obama’s personal notes are not widely available,
making it infeasible to study empathy on the interpersonal level
in great detail. Ben Rhodes’ accounts of private negotiations and
speechwriting were crucial in contextualizing Obama’s thought
process behind various speeches and remarks. However, it leaves
unanswered questions about the significance of interpersonal empathy during the negotiating process itself.
Empathy cannot be hailed unequivocally as a mechanism for
change; as Head describes, “whilst empathy in no way determines
change, it opens up the possibilities for it” (Head, 2012, p. 47).
The success that President Obama had in opening up dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba and reestablishing diplomatic relations
speaks to the importance of considering empathy in foreign policy
and, in Obama’s words, that perhaps it is not a reward to talk to
folks, but the logical way to mitigate conflict. Constant signaling
between Castro and Obama allowed for the recognition of the different parties that held a stake in the matter, and it demonstrated
the importance of recognizing the historical wrongs one’s country committed. However, the current state of human rights in Cuba
suggests that this policy was ineffectual in pushing for democratic
reforms. The broad overview of the role of empathy in Obama’s
philosophy and rhetoric during the Cuban Thaw, provided in this
paper, is an important component in understanding how similar empathetic ideologies function in foreign policy and the limits of their
efficacy. These implications for practitioners of foreign policy and
diplomacy will be better understood with more research and case
study analysis of empathy in conflict transformation
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